

Effects of territorial and worldwide corporation tax systems on outbound M&As

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Abstract

Repatriation taxes reduce the competitiveness of multinational firms from tax credit countries when bidding for targets in low tax countries. This comparative disadvantage with respect to bidders from exemption countries violates ownership neutrality, which results in production inefficiencies due to second-best ownership structures. This paper empirically estimates the magnitude of these effects. The abolishment of repatriation taxes in Japan and in the U.K. in 2009 has increased the number of acquisitions abroad by Japanese firms by 31.9%, while the number of British acquisitions increased by 3.9%. A similar policy switch in the U.S. is simulated to increase the number of U.S. cross-border acquisition by 17.1%. We estimate the yearly gain in efficiency to be around 525 million dollar due to the Japanese reform and 13.5 million dollar due to the U.K. reform. Simulating such a reform for the U.S. results in a yearly efficiency gain of 1134 million dollar.

Keywords: International mergers and acquisitions, business taxation, repatriation taxes, ownership neutrality

JEL-Classification: H25, G34

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1 Introduction

"No one is satisfied with the U.S. corporate tax system. Some argue (...) But others say, the main problem is that the United States has a higher corporate tax rate than any other major country and, unlike other countries, imposes severe taxes on income earned outside its borders. This, they argue, unfairly burdens companies engaged in international competition and discourages the repatriation of profits earned abroad." (Lawrence Summers in the Washington Post July 7th, 2013).

This paper analyzes a particular aspect in which tax systems may distort the international competition between firms: The effect of repatriation taxes on international mergers and acquisitions. When profits from foreign subsidiaries are repatriated by a U.S. corporate parent, the United States tax the dividend at the domestic corporation tax rate of 35 % (plus state taxes) while crediting the foreign taxes already paid on the repatriated profits (foreign dividend tax credit system). On the other hand, all other major developed countries generally exempt dividends received by the parent from foreign subsidiaries from taxation (dividend exemption system).

Repatriation taxes to be paid on a target's profits following international mergers and acquisitions reduce the discounted future cash flows to the investor, which results in a lower valuation of the target. *Ceteris paribus*, due to repatriation taxes, the bid price of U.S. investors is lower relative to an identical investor from an exemption country. Investors from the U.S. should thus less frequently succeed in acquiring targets. Put differently, the U.S. corporate tax system may "unfairly burden companies engaged in international competition" for corporate control. In this paper, we empirically investigate if a foreign tax credit system indeed impedes foreign acquisitions and we quantify the implied loss in efficiency.

This is a particularly relevant issue given the important role that cross-border mergers and acquisitions play for foreign direct investment especially between developed economies. In 2011, their value increased by 53 % to \$ 526 billion and the implied loss in efficiency due to distortions in the market for corporate control may therefore be correspondingly huge.

In 2009, the UK and Japan switched from a tax credit system to an exemption system. This is the first time that two major capital exporting economies have fundamentally changed their international taxation regimes — an event, which allows us to directly identify the regimes' effect on international mergers and acquisitions. In contrast, previous empirical identification strategies had to rely on indirect changes in double taxation due to variations of withholding taxes or corporate tax rates in either the capital exporting or

capital importing country. With such an indirect approach, it is possible that the observed effect of double taxation is actually an artifact which should instead be attributed to the underlying changes themselves — for example, the fact that a tax treaty has been concluded or that the corporate income tax rate has changed.

We consider a large sample of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the period from 2004 to 2010. For every target firm, we analyse the origin of the eventual acquirer by estimating conditional logit models, nested logit models, and simulated maximum likelihood methods. The treatment group in the sample is represented by the acquirer countries, which switch from a foreign tax credit regime to an exemption regime, while the strength of the treatment is moderated by the tax rate differentials between acquirer and target countries.

We find that repatriation taxes reduce the competitiveness of investors from tax credit countries in the international market for corporate control. The size of this effect is conditional on the acquirer's tax rate relative to the rest of the world: the larger the home country's corporate income tax rate, the larger the repatriation taxes due. Accordingly, the effect of the reform is more pronounced for Japan than for the UK because the Japanese tax rate of 40.69% is higher in 2009 than the British tax rate of 28%. We estimate the abolishment of the tax credit system in Japan to have increased the number of international mergers and acquisitions with a Japanese acquirer by 31.9%. The estimated effect for the UK is only 3.9%. We finally simulate a switch in the U.S. from a credit to an exemption regime, which implies an increase in the number of international mergers and acquisitions with U.S. acquirers by 17.1%.

The empirical results are relevant for the ongoing discussion on the U.S. corporate tax system as well as for the scientific discussion on the design of international tax systems. The seminal paper by Musgrave (1969) argued that a foreign tax credit system is optimal from a global perspective because it establishes production efficiency by means of capital export neutrality. On the other hand, Desai and Hines (2003) and Becker and Fuest (2010) develop the counterargument that ownership neutrality may be more relevant for efficiency in a world in which FDI takes place mainly by means of mergers & acquisitions and not by means of greenfield investment. In this case, repatriation taxes distort production efficiency as they distort ownership structures in favor of parent firms, which are not subject to these kind of taxes. Ownership advantages (e.g. expected synergies) are therefore not optimally exploited.

Based on these arguments, Griffith, Hines and Sørensen (2010) recommended abolishing foreign tax credits in the UK in favor of exempting dividends to improve the competitiveness of UK-based multinational companies in the international market for corporate control. The controversial discussion of the two systems of double taxation relief with

respect to neutrality properties would be rather moot if the two systems - as they are actually put in practice - resulted in identical empirical patterns. However, our results confirm that ownership structures are indeed distorted by asymmetries in international taxation as a policy switch from credit to exemption does increase the amount of acquisitions abroad. With respect to distortions of ownership neutrality, we estimate the yearly gain in efficiency in the form of additional synergies raised to be in the order of 525 million dollar for the Japanese tax reform and 13.5 million dollar for the tax reform in the United Kingdom. A simulation of a policy change to an exemption system in the United States implies gains of 1,134 million dollar.

Several papers deal with the empirical effects of international taxation on FDI in general (see e.g. Slemrod (1990), Swenson (1994), Hines (1996), Gropp and Kostial (2000), Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) and Hajkova et al. (2006)). However, the empirical literature on the effect of international taxation on mergers and acquisitions is scarce. Di Giovanni (2005), Herger et al. (2011) and Arulampalam et al. (2012) consider the effect of host country corporate taxation. Huizinga and Voget (2009) additionally include withholding taxes in their analysis, while Barrios et al. (2012) consider the establishment of new foreign subsidiaries. In difference to the previous literature, we directly identify the effect of a systematic change in international taxation. And instead of analyzing the choice of location for investment, we focus on the location of the investor, as our ultimate interest is in the loss of efficiency due to violations of ownership neutrality.

Following this introduction, section 2 describes the tax treatment of foreign source dividends within multinational firms, and it presents the empirical framework for estimating the effect of this international tax on the location of the investor in M&A deals. Section 3 describes the M&A data and the control variables. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 concludes.

2 International Taxation and the Valuation of Firms

In line with the recommendations of the OECD model tax treaty, cross-border dividend repatriations from foreign subsidiaries to their corporate parent within the OECD are generally governed by one of two methods of double taxation relief: either the dividends are exempted from further taxation at the level of the corporate parent (exemption system) or the repatriated dividends are subject to the corporate income tax in the parent's country while receiving a tax credit for taxes already paid abroad (foreign tax credit system). This additional tax burden on repatriated dividends may put acquirers from countries with a foreign credit system at a disadvantage when bidding for foreign corporations, specifically in low tax locations because the additional tax is inversely related to the target firm's

corporate income tax. The unique feature in our period of observation is the policy switch of two major capital exporting countries - Japan and the UK - from a foreign tax credit system to an exemption system in 2009.² Accordingly, the empirical analysis is particularly designed to isolate the effect of this policy change from other developments in the tax system. Furthermore, even country-specific reactions to the financial crisis should not affect our estimation results, as the proposed identification strategy relies on changes on the bilateral level.

2.1 Empirical Model

Following Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Becker and Fuest (2010), let's assume that takeovers reflect the synergies from combining two firms and that all assets are priced at fair value. Let

$$V_{ijk} = \alpha T_{ij} + \boldsymbol{\beta}^\top \mathbf{x}_{ijk} + \epsilon_{ijk}. \quad (1)$$

be the value of firm k in country j if it was owned by an investor from country i .³ The term T_{ij} captures the cost of additional taxation to be paid when dividends are repatriated from country j to country i . The variable vector \mathbf{x}_{ijk} and the error term ϵ_{ijk} represent other observable and unobservable factors, which capture the general size of firm k 's profits as well as ownership-specific synergies which are realized by combining firm k with a particular investor.⁴ Country-specific and time-specific effects are accounted for by means of dummy variables. The error term ϵ_{ijk} follows an extreme value distribution as seen in McFadden (1974), and the coefficients α and $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ are parameters to be estimated. A given target firm will be acquired by an investor from country i if the corresponding reservation price is higher than for any other acquirer,

$$V_{ijk} \geq V_{hjk}, \quad \forall h \in (1, \dots, I) \quad (2)$$

the probability of which is given by⁵

$$P(V_{ijk} \geq V_{hjk} | T_{1jk}, \mathbf{x}_{1jk}, \dots, T_{Ijk}, \mathbf{x}_{Ijk}) = \frac{\exp(\alpha T_{ij} + \boldsymbol{\beta}^\top \mathbf{x}_{ijk})}{\sum_{h=1}^I \exp(\alpha T_{hj} + \boldsymbol{\beta}^\top \mathbf{x}_{hjk})} \quad \forall h. \quad (3)$$

²New Zealand also switched to an exemption system in 2009. In the interest of brevity, we will focus our discussion on the cases of Japan and the UK.

³A subscript t indicating the time-period is suppressed.

⁴Arulampalam et al. (2012) give an example, in which labeling goods with a well-known brand allows the firm to raise prices resulting in larger profits. In Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Palepu (1986), more efficient management increases the target firm's value.

⁵The probability is conditional on the takeover being profitable for at least one acquirer. We expect this condition to be independent of $P(V_{ijk} \geq V_{hjk})$.

where I indicates the number of potential acquirer countries.⁶ The parameters α and β can then be estimated by a conditional logit regression in a sample of M&A deals. A negative value for α would be in line with the conjecture of Desai and Hines (2003), that firms subject to repatriation taxes are at a disadvantage when bidding for foreign firms. While the conditional logit model is conceptually straightforward, estimates may be biased if the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption is violated. Alternatively, mixed logit regressions and nested logit regressions are therefore applied as specified in the robustness checks of the empirical analysis.

2.2 Identification Strategy

The first, most parsimonious approach analyzes the policy change as a treatment effect: Countries with a foreign tax credit system apply the treatment (i.e. additional taxes) to dividends from sources with a lower tax level, in which case the treatment dummy variable takes the value one.⁷ The treatment is abolished by starting to exempt foreign-source dividends from taxation. Unobserved factors are controlled for by country-fixed effects and time-fixed effects.⁸ Specifically, the variable of interest is constructed as

$$T_{ij}^{dummy} = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \tau_i > \tau_j \text{ and country } i \text{ applies foreign tax credit system} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

where τ_j is the corporate income tax rate in the subsidiary's country j and τ_i the tax rate in the parent's country i . However, the parsimony of this approach comes at the cost of precision because the treatment is assumed to be homogenous. In a second step, the heterogeneity of the treatment is therefore taken into account by using the tax differential between host and home country as a measure for the dose of the treatment - the size of repatriation taxes:

$$T_{ij}^{\Delta} = \begin{cases} \tau_i - \tau_j, & \text{if } \tau_i > \tau_j \text{ and country } i \text{ applies foreign tax credit system} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

⁶For the current research question, it is sufficient to analyze the matching of target firms with acquiring countries instead of the matching of target firms with particular acquiring firms — for which it would be challenging to construct an appropriate choice set. Variations in the number of potential acquiring firms across countries are subsumed in country-specific effects, which are accounted for in all regressions.

⁷Foreign tax credits are always limited such that the tax on the repatriated dividends cannot become negative when corporate income taxes are higher in the subsidiary's country than in the parent's country.

⁸Time-fixed effects simply cancel out in this estimation framework as they apply equally to all potential acquirers of a target firm.

If this repatriation tax handicaps the acquisition of foreign firms, one should find a negative effect when estimating its coefficient in expression (3). Some countries do not fully exempt foreign-source dividends. A certain percentage of the dividends may be deemed to be non-deductible expenses and be added to the parent's taxable income, leading to some repatriation tax burden. Moving further away from the treatment effect design, the measure of repatriation taxes can therefore be refined in a third step by also taking into account that some countries such as Germany or France do not fully exempt foreign-source dividends. Instead, usually 5 percent of foreign-source dividends remain subject to corporate income taxes, such that the variable of interest is defined as

$$T_{ij}^{\Delta 2} = \begin{cases} \tau_i - \tau_j, & \text{if } \tau_i > \tau_j \text{ and country } i \text{ applies foreign tax credit system} \\ (1 - \tau_j)x\tau_i, & \text{if country } i \text{ exempts only a share of } (1-x) \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

The above measure accounts only for the tax on dividends imposed by the parent country. The subsidiary's country, however, may impose additional withholding taxes on dividends. Though withholding taxes are creditable foreign taxes, these additional taxes may cause an excess credit situation and the overall double tax on dividend repatriations may increase. If the subsidiary's country levies withholding taxes on dividends the compound double tax is calculated as:⁹

$$T_{ij}^{\Delta 3} = \begin{cases} \max[\tau_i - \tau_j, (1 - \tau_j)\omega_{ij}], & \text{if country } i \text{ applies foreign} \\ & \text{tax credit system} \\ (1 - \tau_j)\omega_{ij} + (1 - \tau_j)(1 - \omega_{ij})x\tau_i, & \text{if country } i \text{ exempts} \\ & \text{only a share of } (1-x) \\ (1 - \tau_j)\omega_{ij}, & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

where ω_{ij} is the applicable withholding tax rate for dividend payments from a subsidiary in country j to its parent in country i . Foreign corporation tax is difficult to avoid even if dividends are eventually repatriated via third countries (e.g. by interposing a foreign conduit company). Dividend routing, however, matters in case of withholding taxes. These taxes may be reduced significantly or even avoided if received by the parent via interposed foreign companies. In line with this, Barrios et al. (2012) find that the establishment of new foreign subsidiaries does not appear to be affected by withholding taxes, which could be attributed to the use of conduit companies.¹⁰ This potential difference in effect

⁹See Huizinga and Voget (2009) or Barrios et al. (2012) for comparison.

¹⁰For example, Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010) provide evidence that high withholding tax rates tend to be avoided by conduit companies.

conditional on the source of repatriation taxes is further investigated in the robustness checks of the empirical analysis.

Table 1: Tax Rates and Dividend Repatriation Taxation Systems

| Acquirer country | Tax Rate | | System | |
|------------------|----------|------|--------|------|
| | 2004 | 2010 | 2004 | 2010 |
| Australia | 0.30 | 0.30 | E | E |
| Austria | 0.34 | 0.25 | E | E |
| Belgium | 0.34 | 0.34 | E95 | E95 |
| Canada | 0.34 | 0.31 | E | E |
| Denmark | 0.30 | 0.25 | E | E |
| Germany | 0.36 | 0.29 | E95 | E95 |
| Finland | 0.29 | 0.26 | E | E |
| France | 0.34 | 0.33 | E95 | E95 |
| Ireland | 0.13 | 0.13 | C | C |
| Italy | 0.37 | 0.31 | E95 | E95 |
| Japan | 0.42 | 0.41 | C | E95 |
| Luxembourg | 0.30 | 0.29 | E | E |
| Netherlands | 0.35 | 0.26 | E | E |
| New Zealand | 0.33 | 0.30 | C | E |
| Norway | 0.28 | 0.28 | E | E97 |
| Spain | 0.35 | 0.30 | E | E |
| Sweden | 0.28 | 0.26 | E | E |
| Switzerland | 0.24 | 0.21 | E | E |
| United Kingdom | 0.30 | 0.28 | C | E |
| United States | 0.39 | 0.39 | C | C |

C: credit, E: exemption, E95: 95 % exemption, E97: 97 % exemption

2004:

Australia applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in Chile, Estonia, Greece, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, Portugal and Turkey. Canada applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in Greece and Turkey. Spain applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in New Zealand and Finland applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in Chile.

2010:

Canada applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in Greece and Turkey. Finland applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in Chile.

Other features of international taxation cannot be explicitly accounted for because it would require speculative assumptions — not only about the actual acquirer but also about its contenders — with respect to their international structure and the timing of repatriations: for example, the repatriation tax may be deferred until the foreign profits are distributed reducing the effective repatriation tax burden. This is implicitly taken into account as it attenuates the estimated coefficient of the statutory double tax measure. Similarly, acquirers may find the potential double tax less relevant if they are in a position of having excess foreign tax credits due to a pre-existing large share of business in high-tax countries. Again, this would be reflected in attenuated coefficient estimates of the statutory double tax measure.

Table 1 summarizes the prevalent method of double tax relief for the potential acquirer

locations at the beginning and at the end of our sample period. The U.S. is by now the only country left, which still applies a foreign tax credit system, aside from Ireland, where the method of double tax relief is practically irrelevant due to the low Irish corporate income tax rate of 12.5%. In Japan the foreign tax credit system was replaced by an exemption system in 2009. The reform was first announced in December 2008 and passed the legislation on March 27, 2009. From April 1, 2009, dividends received are generally exempt although 5% of repatriated profits are still subject to Japanese corporate income taxes as they are deemed to be non-deductible expenses.¹¹ Similarly, the U.K. started to exempt dividends from July 1, 2009. The first proposal was made in June 2007. In July 2008, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury wrote an open letter in which he announced a possible dividend exemption. In December 2008, a draft for discussion was made.¹² In addition, New Zealand replaced its foreign tax credit system by an exemption system on January 1, 2009¹³. General or country-specific shocks around 2009 should not interfere with the previously described identification strategy because the existence and the magnitude of the abolished tax treatment varies on a bilateral level.

3 Data Description

From the Zephyr Bureau van Dijk database, we collect all cross-border corporate M&A deals between OECD countries in the 2004-2010 period through which majority control of the target firm is attained.¹⁴ To keep the mixed logit regressions computationally feasible, the set of acquiring countries considered is restricted to the twenty most frequent acquirer locations. This renders a sample of 12597 M&As. Table 5 in the Appendix lists the number of acquirers by country of origin over time, while Figure 1 illustrates the spatial distribution of acquirer locations. The variation in the total number of M&As over time reflects the cyclical nature of M&A activity, which generally follows the trends in stock markets: the number of M&As peaked in 2007 before falling off. In 2010, the number of M&As had recovered to the level at which it had started in 2004. These general developments — even if they were country-specific — should not distort the estimation results as the proposed identification strategy relies on changes on the bilateral level. In line with the findings by Di Giovanni (2005), countries with large stock markets such as the U.S. and the U.K. also exhibit the largest number of acquirers.

Variable definitions and data sources are listed in Table 6 in the Appendix. Table 7 in


¹¹See Smith et al. (2009), Ernst & Young (2011), p. 562, Carr et al. (2009) and Gutiérrez at al. (2011), p. 553 - 554.

¹²See House of Lords (2009), Ernst & Young (2011), p. 1179, Carr et al. (2009) and Gutiérrez at al. (2011).

¹³See Ernst & Young (2011), p. 789 - 790 and Gutiérrez at al. (2011), p. 759.

¹⁴Deals without a uniquely determined acquirer or target are excluded.

Figure 1: Spatial distribution of acquirers



the Appendix provides summary statistics for the control variables used in the empirical work. On the level of the acquirer country, the corporate income tax rate, τ_i , controls for shocks to the parent firm's investment, which serves as a common input in a multinational production process. For example, Becker and Riedel (2012), find a negative effect of parent country tax rates on foreign affiliate investment. The gross domestic product per capita, $GDPC_i$, and the gross domestic product growth rate, $GDPG_i$, may have a positive effect reflecting differences in productivity across potential acquirers. Good financing conditions as proxied by a country's stock market capitalization relative to GDP, $Stock_i$, should increase the likelihood of a successful bid. Furthermore, a strong exchange rate, $Exch_i$, may facilitate foreign acquisitions (Blonigen (1997)). The variables $GDPS_{ki}$ and $Deals_{ki}$ capture the specialisation of acquirer countries in particular industries. $GDPS_{ki}$ measures the share of the target's industry sector in the GDP of the acquiring country one year prior to the M&A, whereas $Deals_{ki}$ counts how many cross-border deals in the target firm's industry originated from the acquirer country over the preceding 5 years. Several variables such as distance, $Dist_{ij}$, and indicators for common borders, $Neighb_{ij}$, common languages, $Lang_{ij}$, former colonial relationships $Colony_{ij}$, and formerly having been part of the same nation, $Same_{ij}$, control for bilateral variation in transaction costs

which increase with the cultural and geographic distance between countries. These control variables were also found to be relevant for cross-border M&As by Di Giovanni (2005).

4 Empirical Results

Table 2 presents the results of multinomial choice regressions explaining the acquirer's country of origin in the previously described sample of M&As. For every M&A deal, the dependent variable equals one for the actual acquirer's country of origin and zero for the counterfactual acquirer locations. In the conditional logit regression (1), the variable of interest is the parsimonious treatment dummy T_{ij}^{dummy} defined in expression (4), which indicates an additional tax on dividend repatriations due to insufficient foreign tax credits. The negative coefficient implies that the switch to an exemption system by Japan and the U.K. facilitates successful bids for target firms in countries with relatively lower tax rates.

A heterogenous treatment effect is allowed for in regression (2), as the variable of interest T_{ij}^{Δ} , defined in expression (5), measures the size of potential repatriation taxes on dividends. Again, the coefficient is found to be negative, although its p-value is now substantially smaller than in regression (1). The higher significance is most probably due to removing the assumption of homogenous repatriation taxes.

Following Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p. 502), the economic effect implied by regression (2) is estimated by the change in predicted probabilities as the variable of interest is perturbed while keeping all other variables constant. In particular, we simulate the counterfactual that the U.K. had not exempted foreign-source dividends from taxation in 2009 and 2010. Table 3 lists the average predicted probabilities of harboring the successful acquirer in a cross-border M&A deal based on the actual variables in column (1), and based on the simulated variables in column (2). The comparison implies that the switch to an exemption system has increased British acquisitions abroad by 3.9% ($= (0.1581 - 0.1522)/0.1522$) or — in terms of yearly volume — by 1.8 billion US dollar. Along the same lines, we simulate that Japan had not introduced an exemption system in 2009. The corresponding predicted probabilities for the actual and the counterfactual situation in columns (1) and (3) imply that Japanese acquisitions abroad have increased by 31.9% or — in terms of yearly volume — by 4.1 billion US dollar. The more pronounced effect is due to the Japanese corporate income tax rate of 40.7% being considerably higher than the British corporate income tax rate of 28%. Hence, the abolished potential double taxation of Japanese dividend repatriations was larger and occurred in more cases than for British repatriations. In fact, the Japanese tax rate is the maximum tax rate through the whole sample period. Inspired by the discussion in the U.S. for a reform of foreign

Table 2: Regression estimates

| | Conditional logit | | Mixed logit | | | |
|-------------------|-------------------|------------|-------------|------------|------------|------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| T_{ij}^{dummy} | -0.1210* | | | | | |
| | (0.052) | | | | | |
| T_{ij}^{Δ} | | -2.7896*** | -2.7111*** | -2.7111*** | -2.7111** | -2.7111*** |
| | | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.009) | (0.017) | (0.000) |
| τ_i | -1.7916** | -1.4887* | -1.8587** | -1.8587 | -1.8587* | -1.8587 |
| | (0.021) | (0.057) | (0.032) | (0.155) | (0.055) | (0.207) |
| $GDP C_i$ | 0.0520** | 0.0513** | 0.0526** | 0.0526* | 0.0526** | 0.0526* |
| | (0.018) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.090) | (0.035) | (0.072) |
| $GDP G_i$ | 0.0719*** | 0.0732*** | 0.0754*** | 0.0754*** | 0.0754*** | 0.0754*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| $Stock_i$ | 0.0022*** | 0.0020** | 0.0021** | 0.0021** | 0.0021** | 0.0021* |
| | (0.009) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.045) | (0.040) | (0.088) |
| $Exch_i$ | -0.0091 | -0.0040 | -0.0044 | -0.0044 | -0.0044 | -0.0044 |
| | (0.188) | (0.547) | (0.510) | (0.565) | (0.541) | (0.562) |
| $GDP S_{ki}$ | 0.0081*** | 0.0082*** | 0.0081*** | 0.0081*** | 0.0081** | 0.0081** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.002) | (0.032) | (0.026) |
| $Deals_{ki}$ | 0.0002*** | 0.0002*** | 0.0002*** | 0.0002*** | 0.0002*** | 0.0002*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| $Dist_{ij}$ | -0.5375*** | -0.5213*** | -0.5316*** | -0.5316*** | -0.5316*** | -0.5316*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| $Neighb_{ij}$ | 0.2541*** | 0.2746*** | 0.3204*** | 0.3204*** | 0.3204*** | 0.3204*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.001) | (0.000) |
| $Lang_{ij}$ | 0.7547*** | 0.7761*** | 0.8284*** | 0.8284*** | 0.8284*** | 0.8284*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| $Colony_{ij}$ | 0.3816*** | 0.3487*** | 0.3587*** | 0.3587*** | 0.3587*** | 0.3587*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| $Same_{ij}$ | 0.6123*** | 0.6100*** | 0.8181*** | 0.8181*** | 0.8181*** | 0.8181*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Observations | 240364 | 240364 | 240364 | 240364 | 240364 | 240364 |
| Log-Likelihood | -27680.99 | -27663.90 | -27639.02 | -27639.02 | -27639.02 | -27639.02 |

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if country i is the actual acquirer's country of origin in an M&A deal. It is zero if country i is a counterfactual acquirer location. Regression (1) and (2) are conditional logit regressions, while regressions (3) to (6) are mixed logit regressions. All regressions control for acquirer country specific effects, which follow a random distribution in the mixed logit regressions. The parameter estimates for the acquirer country-specific estimates in the mixed logit regressions are shown in Table 8. Regressions (4) to (6) are identical to regression (3) except for standard errors, which are robust to clustering on the target-country/year level, target-country/industry level and the industry/year level, respectively. p -values in parentheses, * denotes significance at the 10 %-level, ** at the 5 %-level and *** at the 1 %-level respectively.

corporate income taxation, we also simulate that the U.S. had exempted foreign-source dividends in 2009 and 2010, the average predicted probabilities of which are listed in column (4). Such a policy change is calculated to increase the number of U.S. acquisitions abroad by 17.1 % or — in terms of yearly volume — by 15.9 billion US dollar.¹⁵

¹⁵The calculation of yearly volumes is based on the acquiring country's average deal value in the sample period 2004-2010.

Table 3: Effect of policy change based on regression (2) of Table 2

| Country | Reforms 2009 - 2010: | | | |
|---------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|
| | Actual state 2009-2010 | No Reform UK 2009-2010 | No Reform JP 2009-2010 | Reform US 2009-2010 |
| Australia | 0.0295 | 0.0297 | 0.0297 | 0.0274 |
| Austria | 0.0158 | 0.0159 | 0.0159 | 0.0146 |
| Belgium | 0.0262 | 0.0264 | 0.0263 | 0.0244 |
| Canada | 0.0900 | 0.0902 | 0.0902 | 0.0873 |
| Denmark | 0.0232 | 0.0234 | 0.0234 | 0.0215 |
| Finland | 0.0220 | 0.0222 | 0.0222 | 0.0203 |
| France | 0.0721 | 0.0726 | 0.0725 | 0.0666 |
| Germany | 0.0752 | 0.0758 | 0.0756 | 0.0695 |
| Ireland | 0.0140 | 0.0141 | 0.0141 | 0.0127 |
| Italy | 0.0152 | 0.0154 | 0.0153 | 0.0141 |
| Japan | 0.0211 | 0.0212 | 0.0160 | 0.0195 |
| Luxembourg | 0.0095 | 0.0095 | 0.0095 | 0.0089 |
| Netherlands | 0.0639 | 0.0642 | 0.0642 | 0.0595 |
| New Zealand | 0.0077 | 0.0078 | 0.0078 | 0.0071 |
| Norway | 0.0219 | 0.0221 | 0.0220 | 0.0202 |
| Spain | 0.0192 | 0.0193 | 0.0193 | 0.0178 |
| Sweden | 0.0534 | 0.0538 | 0.0537 | 0.0493 |
| Switzerland | 0.0356 | 0.0357 | 0.0357 | 0.0331 |
| United Kindom | 0.1581 | 0.1522 | 0.1589 | 0.1483 |
| United States | 0.3394 | 0.3410 | 0.3411 | 0.3973 |

Numbers are relative frequencies of all deals with acquirer from the specific country in the given period predicted based on regression (2).

Among the control variables, the likelihood of a successful bid is negatively related to the acquirer's corporate income tax rate, τ_i , as shocks to investment in common input factors at the parent level appear to decrease the value of acquisitions abroad. The positive signs of gross domestic product per capita, $GDPC_i$, and of the gross domestic product growth rate, $GDPG_i$, suggest that highly productive firms are more likely to engage in foreign direct investment as argued by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). The positive effect of stock market capitalization over GDP, $Stock_i$, reflects the comparative advantage of acquirers with access to well developed capital markets. The exchange rate does not show a significant effect. Specialization in the target's industry — as measured by the relevant industry sector share in the acquiring country's GDP, $GDPS_{ki}$, and the acquiring country's number of cross-border acquisitions in the relevant industry over the preceding 5 years, $Deals_{ki}$ — also appears to explain the prevailing acquirer location. The significant effects of distance, $Dist_{ij}$, common borders, $Neighb_{ij}$, common languages, $Lang_{ij}$, former colonial relationships, $Colony_{ij}$, and formerly having been part of the same nation, $Same_{ij}$, suggest the presence of bilateral transaction costs, for example, in the form of cultural frictions or information costs.

The conditional logit regressions may be inconsistent if the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is violated. We test the IIA assumption by a series of 20 Hausman tests, in which one country at a time is excluded from the choice set. In half of the cases, the estimates based on the reduced samples differ significantly from the full sample estimates, which casts doubt on the validity of the IIA assumption. On the other hand, Cheng and Long (2006) argue that tests of the IIA assumption based on restricted choice sets perform very poorly even in large samples. Nevertheless, the IIA assumption appears to be rather strong from a theoretical perspective, for example, if acquirer countries' industrial specialisations cannot be sufficiently controlled for by observables: a manufacturing firm, may be more likely to be acquired by a German firm, whereas a target firm in the financial industry may be more likely to be acquired from the U.K. or from the U.S. One set of acquirer-country fixed effects for the whole sample would be too restrictive then, as the effects should vary across industries. Similarly, regional markets may integrate at different speeds than the global market and a target may be more likely (or less likely) to be acquired from a country within the same regional market than from overseas. In both cases the IIA assumption is violated. Allowing for a larger number of fixed effects — acquirer-country by industry, acquirer-country by target-country or even a combination of the two — by means of dummy variables is not a viable approach as the large number of parameters would result in an incidental parameter bias (Greene (2012), p. 659-661).

Instead, a mixed logit estimator (Train (2009), p. 138) is applied in regression (3) of Table 2, in which the vector of coefficients for the country-specific effects γ is allowed to be random according to a normal distribution with mean \mathbf{g} and covariance \mathbf{W} . Parameters are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood with 50 Halton draws. The estimated standard deviations of the normal distribution are highly significant indicating that this approach should be preferred to the conditional logit regression. Therefore, we stick to mixed logit regressions for most of the remaining analysis. Eventually, this choice is immaterial because the basic implications remain similar: the coefficient of the variable of interest, Tax_{ij}^{Δ} remains significantly negative in regression (3). As previously, we simulate counterfactual policies in the U.K., in Japan, and in the U.S for taxing foreign-source dividends in the period 2009-2010. The change in average predicted probabilities suggests that exempting dividends has increased — or, in the case of the U.S., would have increased — the number of acquisitions abroad by 3.7% for the U.K., by 30.4% for Japan, and 16.2% for the U.S. Regressions (4) through (6) are similar to regression (3), but standard errors are now robust to clustering at the level of the target-country/year pairs (regression (4)), at the level of industry/year pairs (regression (5)), and at the level of target-country/industry pairs (regression (6)). The level of significance is hardly sensi-

tive to the choice of clustering. The same result is found when errors are simply clustered by industry.

As mentioned before, the unique feature in our data is the policy switch of two major capital exporting countries - Japan and the UK - from a foreign tax credit system to an exemption system. However, tax rates varied between 2004 and 2010, which also affects our repatriation tax measure T_{ij}^{Δ} . In regression (1) of Table 4, we therefore rely solely on regime changes for identification by calculating repatriation taxes with tax rates fixed to their values in 2008, one year prior to the British and Japanese reforms. The estimates remain similar, which confirms that the effect is indeed identified by the changes in the method of double tax relief and not by variations in the underlying corporate income tax rates.

Acquisition behavior may have already adjusted in the run-up to the effective change in policy if agents started to anticipate the eventual introduction of an exemption system ahead of time. Therefore, regression (2) of Table 4 excludes all observations from 2008, the year prior to the reforms, without much change in the results.

Profitable target firms may indeed be bought for the future profits they promise to generate while loss-making firms may be bought for strategic reasons such as removing the threat of a potential future competitor or acquiring a common input factor. The former group of acquisitions could be more affected by taxes on dividend repatriations than the latter group. This hypothesis is tested in regression (3) of Table 4 by allowing the coefficient of T_{ij}^{Δ} to differ between the two groups. Indeed, repatriation taxes appear to have a stronger effect in case of profitable target firms than in case of loss-making target firms. The difference in the coefficients is significant at a p-value of 0.0543.¹⁶

Regression (4) of Table 4 controls for further heterogeneity in target firms by allowing the propensity to be acquired by a particular country to vary conditional on target-specific controls (total assets and profitability). The coefficient for repatriation taxes remains significant and increases in size. Table 9 lists the coefficients of the target-specific variables per acquirer location except for the U.S., which serves as the country of reference. Interestingly, the coefficients for target profitability are significantly positive for quite a number of acquirer locations, but never significantly negative. This pattern implies that the probability of a U.S. acquirer decreases in the target firm's profitability, which may reflect that highly profitable firms are relatively less valuable to U.S. acquirers due to repatriation taxes — in line with the findings of the previous robustness check, where the acquisition of profitable targets was more affected by repatriation taxes than the acquisition of loss-making firms.

¹⁶Correspondingly, a one-sided test for a more negative coefficient in case of profitable firms would have a p-value of 0.0271.

Table 4: Robustness checks

| | Mixlogit | | | | | Nested Logit | | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| T_{ij}^{Δ} | -1.5979*** (0.002) | -2.7164*** (0.000) | | -5.4768*** (0.000) | -3.9874*** (0.000) | | | | -2.8007*** (0.000) |
| $T_{ij}^{\Delta}(Profit_k)$ | | | -2.9824*** (0.000) | | | | | | |
| $T_{ij}^{\Delta}(Loss_k)$ | | | -1.4876** (0.033) | | | | | | |
| $T_{ij}^{\Delta 2}$ | | | | | | -2.7292*** (0.000) | | -2.6575*** (0.000) | |
| $T_{ij}^{\Delta 3}$ | | | | | | | -0.2314 (0.326) | | |
| <i>Withholding</i> g_{ij} | | | | | | | | 0.3767 (0.142) | |
| τ_i | -2.1991** (0.011) | -1.1207 (0.242) | -2.0650** (0.017) | 0.8411 (0.547) | -1.6156** (0.048) | -1.8140** (0.037) | -2.2118** (0.011) | -1.7998** (0.038) | -1.0107 (0.128) |
| $GDP C_i$ | 0.0526** (0.022) | 0.0672*** (0.009) | 0.0507** (0.027) | 0.0169 (0.651) | 0.0550** (0.018) | 0.0524** (0.022) | 0.0502** (0.029) | 0.0527** (0.021) | 0.0553*** (0.002) |
| $GDP G_i$ | 0.0737*** (0.000) | 0.0779*** (0.000) | 0.0727*** (0.000) | 0.0634*** (0.001) | 0.0744*** (0.000) | 0.0753*** (0.000) | 0.0730*** (0.000) | 0.0755*** (0.000) | 0.0557*** (0.000) |
| $Stock_i$ | 0.0023*** (0.009) | 0.0018 (0.118) | 0.0022** (0.013) | 0.0026* (0.089) | 0.0021** (0.021) | 0.0021** (0.019) | 0.0024*** (0.008) | 0.0021** (0.019) | 0.0014** (0.038) |
| $Erch_i$ | -0.0079 (0.248) | -0.0023 (0.737) | -0.0099 (0.136) | 0.0013 (0.911) | -0.0032 (0.637) | -0.0058 (0.387) | -0.0135** (0.042) | -0.0051 (0.448) | -0.0028 (0.432) |


to be continued on next page

Table 4: Robustness checks - continued

| | Mixlogit | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) |
| $GDPS_{ki}$ | 0.0082*** (0.000) | 0.0067*** (0.003) | 0.0082*** (0.000) | 0.0051 (0.132) | 0.0084*** (0.000) | 0.0081*** (0.000) | 0.0081*** (0.000) | 0.0082*** (0.000) | 0.0078*** (0.000) |
| $Deals_{ki}$ | 0.0002*** (0.000) | 0.0002*** (0.000) | 0.0002*** (0.000) | 0.0002*** (0.000) | 0.0002*** (0.000) | 0.0002*** (0.000) | 0.0002*** (0.000) | 0.0002*** (0.000) | 0.0002*** (0.000) |
| $Dist_{ij}$ | -0.5371*** (0.000) | -0.5319*** (0.000) | -0.5363*** (0.000) | -0.5938*** (0.000) | -0.5326*** (0.000) | -0.5316*** (0.000) | -0.5474*** (0.000) | -0.5377*** (0.000) | -0.4765*** (0.000) |
| $Neighb_{ij}$ | 0.3057*** (0.000) | 0.3310*** (0.000) | 0.3034*** (0.000) | 0.5617*** (0.000) | 0.3096*** (0.000) | 0.3200*** (0.000) | 0.2949*** (0.000) | 0.3142*** (0.000) | 0.2688*** (0.000) |
| $Lang_{ij}$ | 0.8250*** (0.000) | 0.8241*** (0.000) | 0.7999*** (0.000) | 0.8200*** (0.000) | 0.8272*** (0.000) | 0.8291*** (0.000) | 0.8044*** (0.000) | 0.8487*** (0.000) | 0.6502*** (0.000) |
| $Colony_{ij}$ | 0.3728*** (0.000) | 0.3606*** (0.000) | 0.3962*** (0.000) | 0.1671** (0.019) | 0.3588*** (0.000) | 0.3582*** (0.000) | 0.3956*** (0.000) | 0.3542*** (0.000) | 0.2669*** (0.000) |
| $Same_{ij}$ | 0.8297*** (0.000) | 0.7811*** (0.000) | 0.8199*** (0.000) | 0.6622*** (0.001) | 0.6402*** (0.000) | 0.8187*** (0.000) | 0.8401*** (0.000) | 0.8105*** (0.000) | 0.5010*** (0.000) |
| T_{ij}^{Δ} Std. dev. | | | | | -5.7331*** (0.000) | | | | |
| Observations | 240364 | 203943 | 240364 | 87980 | 240364 | 240364 | 240364 | 240364 | 240364 |
| Log-Likelihood | -27651.03 | -23266.86 | -27636.56 | -10724.60 | -27635.11 | -27638.95 | -27655.34 | -27637.87 | -27612.61 |

Notes: The dependent variable equals one if country i is the actual acquirer's country of origin in an M&A deal. It is zero if country i is a counterfactual acquirer location. Regressions (1) to (8) are mixed logit regressions, while regression (9) is a nested logit regression, in which countries are grouped according to their geographic location in Asia/Australasia, Europe, and North America at the first level of a two-level choice process. All regressions control for acquirer country specific effects. Regression (1) fixes tax rate differences to the values of the year 2008 for computing T_{ij}^{Δ} . Regression (2) excludes all deals from 2008. Regression (3) allows a separate coefficient of T_{ij}^{Δ} for profitable and not profitable targets. Regression (4) expands the set of control variables by the target firm specific control variables $Asset_k$ and $Prof_k$, the coefficients of which are presented in Table 9 as their effect varies across the potential acquirer locations. Regression (5) randomizes the coefficient of T_{ij}^{Δ} . Regressions (6) to (8) use more precise measures of repatriation taxes. p -values in parentheses, * denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level and *** at the 1%-level respectively.

Figure 2: Kernel density of simulated coefficients of T_{ij}^{Δ}



The figure shows the kernel distribution of simulated coefficients of T_{ij}^{Δ} in specification (5) of Table 4 using the method described by Train (2009, p.256) with 50 Halton draws. The mean of the simulated coefficients is -3.99, the standard deviation is 1.28. The bandwidth for the kernel density is 0.13.

Instead of modeling the source of heterogeneity explicitly, regression (5) of Table 4 accounts for different sensitivity to double taxation by also allowing the coefficient of T_{ij}^{Δ} to be randomly distributed. With a value of -3.99, the average coefficient is more negative than in the previous regressions. Specific values of the coefficients per target firm can be simulated as in Train (2009, p.256). Figure 2 displays a Kernel density estimate of these simulated coefficients. In line with the previous robustness checks investigating the relationship between double taxation and target profitability, there is a significant difference in target profitability when the sample is split at the median of the simulated coefficients of T_{ij}^{Δ} . Observations with more negative coefficients have an average ratio of profit to assets of 4.1 percent whereas observations with less negative coefficients have an average ratio of profits to assets of 2.8 percent.¹⁷

¹⁷Extreme outliers of profit-to-assets ratios below -1 or above 1 were disregarded. Otherwise the sample

Regression (6) of Table 4 departs from the treatment effect design by using the repatriation tax measure $T_{ij}^{\Delta 2}$ defined by expression (6) on p. 6, which also accounts for repatriation taxes due to incomplete exemption of dividends as some countries exempt only 95 percent or 97 percent of repatriated dividends from taxation. The estimated coefficients are very similar to previous results.

The measure $T_{ij}^{\Delta 2}$ in expression (6) accounts only for the tax on dividends imposed by the parent country. This tax is difficult to avoid even if dividends are eventually repatriated via third countries. The overall double tax on dividend repatriations $T_{ij}^{\Delta 3}$ defined by expression (7) can be larger if the subsidiary's country imposes withholding taxes, which a multinational may or may not be able to circumvent by means of conduit companies. In regression (7) of Table 4, the coefficient for $T_{ij}^{\Delta 3}$ is considerably attenuated compared to previous estimates and it is no longer significant, which suggests that withholding taxes may have a different effect than taxes imposed by the parent firm's country. This hypothesis is explicitly investigated in regression (8) of Table 4 by including

$$Withholding_{ij} = T_{ij}^{\Delta 3} - T_{ij}^{\Delta 2} \quad (8)$$

as a separate variable, which captures the potential additional tax burden due to withholding taxes, while $T_{ij}^{\Delta 2}$ controls for taxes imposed by the parent firm's country. The two coefficients are found to be significantly different with a p-value of less than 0.01. The negative coefficient of $T_{ij}^{\Delta 2}$ is similar to previous estimates while the insignificant coefficient of $Withholding_{ij}$ with a point estimate close to zero suggests that withholding taxes can be avoided at low cost. This result is similar to the finding of Barrios et al. (2012) that the establishment of new foreign subsidiaries does not appear to be affected by withholding taxes.

The nested logit regression (9) in Table 4 is an alternative to the mixed logit approach, which is also robust to violations of the IIA assumption. As a generalization of the conditional logit regression, it allows for a two-level choice process: at the first level a preferred subset of choices is determined, while the specific choice is picked at the second level from within the subset.¹⁸ However, some structure has to be imposed ex-ante by defining the relevant subsets of choices. In the current setting, a geographic grouping of potential acquirer countries appears most sensible. In particular, we distinguish between acquirers from Asia/Australasia, from Europe, and from North-America. As before, T_{ij}^{Δ} has a significantly negative effect.


The results above show that taxes on dividend repatriations distort cross-border ownership patterns. As the additional tax burden differs between acquirer locations, one

variance would increase from 0.045 to 334 and the kurtosis would increase from 7.9 to 4553.

¹⁸See, for example, Greene (2012), p.808-810, for more details.

expects the observed ownership structures to be inefficient. Larger synergies could be exploited by an alternative matching of acquirers and targets.

Figure 3: Distribution of premiums paid by Japanese acquirers



The figure shows the kernel density estimate of premiums paid by Japanese acquirers for foreign listed companies. The premium is defined as hundred times the difference between the acquisition price and the price one day prior to the announcement of the acquisition, divided by the latter. 24.2 percent of the M&As have a premium smaller than 12.8. The bandwidth for the kernel density is 22.0.

In order to calculate the decrease in synergies due to second-best ownership, we cut-off the left tail of the distribution of take-over premia offered by Japanese acquirers — displayed in Figure 3 — such that the proportion of the left tail relative to the whole distribution is equal to the increase in the total number of M&As due to switching from a credit to an exemption system (as calculated on p. 10). At the cut-off, the premium is 12.8 percentage points. This value is the upper bound for the loss in synergies caused by inefficient ownership due to double taxation. This upper bound is reached, for example, under the (polar) assumption that for all the acquisitions by Japanese firms, the second-best bidder is never willing to pay more for a target firm than the going market price. Hence, if all Japanese acquirers decreased their premiums offered by 12.8 percentage

points, then 24.2 percent of the acquisitions would no longer have a Japanese acquirer. The synergies reflected in the take-over premia of these acquisitions would no longer be realized.¹⁹

The loss in synergies would be correspondingly smaller than this upper bound if there exist second-best bids close to the first best bids of the Japanese acquirers - because then a smaller reduction in the premiums offered by Japanese acquirers would already cause the same proportion of M&As to be lost.

The increase in M&As with Japanese acquirers due to switching to an exemption system - estimated on p. 10 - represents an average yearly deal volume of 4,100 million US dollar. Hence, the yearly efficiency loss due to inefficient ownership caused by Japanese double taxation may have been up to 525 million US dollar ($=12.8\% \times 4,100$ million US dollar).

Similar calculations show the value of synergies raised to be in the order of 13.5 million dollar per year for the case of the British international tax reform. Simulating such a reform for the U.S. results in a yearly value of 1,134 million dollar of additional synergies.

5 Conclusion

The empirical analysis finds that multinationals from countries which impose taxes on repatriated profits have indeed a comparative disadvantage in acquiring foreign firms. Japan and the U.K. both started to exempt foreign-source dividends from tax in 2009. These reforms are found to have increased the number of foreign acquisitions by Japanese firms by 31.9%, whereas the number of foreign acquisitions by British firms increased by 3.9%. The identification approach relies directly on policy changes in double tax relief and not on changes in tax rates, so we can exclude that the observed effects are just an artifact of a change in the underlying corporate income tax. The implied loss in efficiency due to violations of ownership neutrality is sizeable: in the case of double taxation of multinationals based in the U.S., the loss in efficiency of 1,134 million dollar per year is in the order of 1.2 percent of the yearly total value of U.S. acquisitions abroad. In that sense, one could draw the conclusion that the U.S. — as the only remaining major country still relying on a foreign tax credit system — should follow the British and Japanese example of exempting foreign source dividends in order to create a level playing field for competing acquirers and thereby avoid second-best ownership structures.

However, our results should not be interpreted as suggesting that exempting dividends from tax is a panacea for all inefficiencies which may arise in the international investment process. First, Becker and Fuest (2010) argue, that even for M&As, the exemption system is not optimal from a national perspective if foreign acquisitions rely on rival input factors

¹⁹Andrade et al. (2001) show that synergies are almost fully reflected in take-over premia.

from the headquarter, for example, management capacity. Foreign activities would then crowd out domestic forms of engagement. Second, the aspect of capital export neutrality raised by Musgrave (1969) still applies to the classic mode of FDI, in which capital is exported. Eventually, the optimal balance between ownership neutrality and capital export neutrality should depend on the relative share of greenfield investment versus M&As in foreign direct investment. The alternative option of discriminating the two modes of FDI for tax purposes may not be feasible in practice.

Appendix

Table 5: Regional origin of acquirers

| Country | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Austria | 28 | 27 | 33 | 39 | 45 | 27 | 16 |
| Australia | 36 | 51 | 61 | 84 | 53 | 40 | 31 |
| Belgium | 45 | 46 | 68 | 46 | 42 | 31 | 34 |
| Canada | 170 | 169 | 154 | 157 | 137 | 104 | 164 |
| Denmark | 43 | 62 | 55 | 45 | 55 | 27 | 25 |
| Finland | 40 | 54 | 60 | 59 | 71 | 28 | 44 |
| France | 97 | 129 | 126 | 146 | 141 | 115 | 100 |
| Germany | 75 | 108 | 117 | 148 | 120 | 102 | 84 |
| Ireland | 46 | 40 | 42 | 81 | 31 | 18 | 21 |
| Italy | 19 | 29 | 40 | 38 | 39 | 19 | 19 |
| Japan | 24 | 36 | 32 | 33 | 33 | 26 | 28 |
| Luxembourg | 8 | 23 | 24 | 28 | 15 | 13 | 18 |
| Netherlands | 89 | 123 | 129 | 148 | 134 | 81 | 88 |
| New Zealand | 14 | 17 | 9 | 21 | 17 | 5 | 4 |
| Norway | 25 | 58 | 58 | 50 | 44 | 23 | 24 |
| Spain | 40 | 42 | 48 | 50 | 47 | 22 | 25 |
| Sweden | 66 | 100 | 103 | 138 | 103 | 72 | 80 |
| Switzerland | 56 | 66 | 67 | 75 | 91 | 60 | 44 |
| United Kingdom | 224 | 317 | 309 | 354 | 242 | 142 | 190 |
| United States | 450 | 514 | 524 | 521 | 448 | 318 | 451 |
| all countries | 1595 | 2011 | 2059 | 2261 | 1908 | 1273 | 1490 |

The table reports the number of cross-border M&As per country of acquirer and year.

Table 6: Variables

| | |
|----------|--|
| τ_i | Corporate income tax rate of the candidate-country including average state and municipal taxes, measured in percentage-points (0.01 = one percent). Used to compute T_{ij}^{dummy} , T_{ij}^{Δ} and $T_{ij}^{\Delta^2}$. Sources: Chennells and Griffith (1997), Eurostat (2004), and KPMG (2003). IBFD (2010a). Previous issues of these publications were consulted as well. |
| τ_j | Corporate income tax of the target-country including average state and municipal taxes, measured in percentage-points (0.01 = one percent). |

Table 6: (continued)

| | |
|---------------|--|
| | Used to compute T_{ij}^{dummy} , T_{ij}^{Δ} and $T_{ij}^{\Delta^2}$. Sources: like τ_i |
| ω_{ij} | Withholding tax rate applicable for dividends distributed from country j to a parent located in country i . Sources: Coopers & Lybrand (1998) and IBFD (2010a, 2010b). Previous issues of these publications were consulted as well. |
| $GDPC_i$ | Per capita gross domestic product in thousand dollars in the year before the announcement date in the candidate-country converted to international dollar using purchasing power parity rates. Source: Worldbank (2010). |
| $GDPG_i$ | Growth rate of gross domestic product of the candidate-country in the year of the announcement date, measured in percentage-points. Sources: Worldbank (2010) and OECD (2010), "Aggregate National Accounts: Gross domestic product", OECD National Accounts Statistics (database) for 2010 data. |
| $Stock_i$ | Share price times the number of shares outstanding of listed companies in the candidate-country in the year before the announcement of the deal. Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. Listed companies does not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment vehicles. Measured in percentage of gross domestic product. Source: Worldbank (2010). |
| $Exch_i$ | Exchange rate in the candidate-country, national currency per US Dollar. Sources: OECD (2010), "OECD Economic Outlook No. 88", OECD Economic Outlook: Statistics and Projections (database). |
| $GDPS_{ki}$ | Fraction of the target industry sector (first, second or third) in the gross domestic product of the candidate country in the year before the announcement date. Source: Worldbank (2010), target sector taken from SIC-codes provided by Zephyr. |
| $Deals_{ki}$ | Number of deals in the industry of the target-company (first character of the 4-digit-sic-code) with acquirer-company in the candidate-country in the 5-year period before the year of announcement of the deal. Source: Zephyr, Bureau van Dijk |
| $Dist_{ij}$ | Logarithm of the simple distance between the most populated cities of the candidate- and target-country in km. Source: Mayer and Zignago (2005). |
| $Neighb_{ij}$ | Dummy variable, 1 for contiguity of candidate- and target-country. |

Table 6: (continued)

| | |
|----------------------------|---|
| | Source: Mayer and Zignago (2005). |
| <i>Lang_{ij}</i> | Dummy variable, 1 for common official primary language in the candidate- and target-country. |
| | Source: Mayer and Zignago (2005). |
| <i>Colony_{ij}</i> | Dummy variable, 1 if candidate- and target-country pairs were ever in colonial relationship. |
| | Source: Mayer and Zignago (2005). |
| <i>Same_{ij}</i> | Dummy variable, 1 if candidate- and target-country were or are the same country. |
| | Source: Mayer and Zignago (2005). |
| <i>Asset_k</i> | Logarithm of pre-deal target total assets in thousand US Dollar in the last available year before the acquisition announcement. |
| | Source: Zephyr, Bureau van Dijk. |
| <i>Prof_k</i> | Pre-deal target profit after tax in thousand US Dollar in the last available year before the announcement divided by pre-deal target total assets in thousand US Dollar in the last available year before the acquisition announcement. |
| | Source: Zephyr, Bureau van Dijk. |

Table 7: Summary statistics

| Variable | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min. | Max. |
|------------------------------------|--------|---------|-----------|---------|----------|
| T_{ij}^{Δ} | 240364 | 0.010 | 0.034 | 0 | 0.296 |
| T_{ij}^{Δ} (2008 tax rates) | 240364 | 0.011 | 0.035 | 0 | 0.283 |
| $T_{ij}^{\Delta}(Profit_k)$ | 240364 | 0.003 | 0.019 | 0 | 0.296 |
| $T_{ij}^{\Delta}(Loss_k)$ | 240364 | 0.001 | 0.011 | 0 | 0.283 |
| $T_{ij}^{\Delta 2}$ | 240364 | 0.013 | 0.033 | 0 | 0.296 |
| $T_{ij}^{\Delta 3}$ | 240364 | 0.078 | 0.087 | 0 | 0.302 |
| $Withholding_{ij}$ | 240364 | 0.065 | 0.084 | 0 | 0.291 |
| τ_i | 240364 | 0.300 | 0.063 | 0.125 | 0.421 |
| $GDPC_i$ | 240364 | 35.406 | 9.437 | 24.291 | 74.422 |
| $GDPG_i$ | 240364 | 1.918 | 2.536 | -8.019 | 6.474 |
| $Stock_i$ | 240364 | 95.906 | 57.375 | 13.474 | 323.710 |
| $Exch_i$ | 240364 | 7.237 | 23.558 | 0.500 | 117.755 |
| $GDPS_{ki}$ | 240364 | 54.038 | 22.003 | 0.303 | 86.440 |
| $Deals_{ki}$ | 240364 | 346.027 | 791.803 | 0 | 8184 |
| $Dist_{ij}$ | 240364 | 7.886 | 1.293 | 4.088 | 9.883 |
| $Neighb_{ij}$ | 240364 | 0.113 | 0.317 | 0 | 1 |
| $Lang_{ij}$ | 240364 | 0.210 | 0.407 | 0 | 1 |
| $Colony_{ij}$ | 240364 | 0.099 | 0.298 | 0 | 1 |
| $Same_{ij}$ | 240364 | 0.010 | 0.100 | 0 | 1 |
| $Asset_k$ | 87890 | 9.288 | 2.125 | 0.693 | 20.483 |
| $Prof_k$ | 87890 | 0.2100 | 18.275 | -57.588 | 1236.621 |

For detailed variable descriptions and data sources, see Table 6.

Table 8: Regression results for the candidate-country fixed effects, column (3) of Table 2

| Variable name | Mean | P-value mean | Standard deviation | P-value standard deviation |
|---------------|---------|--------------|--------------------|----------------------------|
| AT | -2.9562 | 0.000 | -0.7881 | 0.043 |
| AU | -1.2810 | 0.000 | -0.0516 | 0.831 |
| BE | -3.6807 | 0.000 | 1.4807 | 0.000 |
| CA | -1.6021 | 0.000 | 0.3481 | 0.258 |
| CH | -3.9036 | 0.000 | 1.8072 | 0.000 |
| DE | -1.6729 | 0.000 | -1.1924 | 0.000 |
| DK | -1.8686 | 0.000 | 0.0114 | 0.978 |
| ES | -1.6131 | 0.000 | 0.2674 | 0.510 |
| FI | -2.3660 | 0.000 | 0.9586 | 0.000 |
| FR | -1.1623 | 0.001 | -0.6353 | 0.084 |
| UK | -0.7475 | 0.003 | -0.2658 | 0.089 |
| IE | -3.3576 | 0.000 | -0.5147 | 0.136 |
| IT | -1.8188 | 0.000 | -0.5780 | 0.093 |
| JP | -0.3221 | 0.674 | -0.0621 | 0.888 |
| LU | -5.9488 | 0.000 | -0.0881 | 0.916 |
| NL | -2.5249 | 0.000 | -1.6621 | 0.000 |
| NO | -2.6500 | 0.000 | -0.0983 | 0.763 |
| NZ | -2.0189 | 0.000 | -0.2419 | 0.527 |
| SE | -1.2508 | 0.000 | -0.1006 | 0.598 |

The table reports the means and standard deviations of the random coefficients of the potential acquirer country dummy variables in regression (3) of Table 2. The U.S. represents the base category.

Table 9: Regression results for candidate-country fixed effects and target-specific variables $Asset_k$ and $Prof_k$, column (4) of Table 4

| Variable name | Coefficient | P-value | Standard deviation | P-value standard deviation |
|---------------|-------------|---------|--------------------|----------------------------|
| AT* $Asset_k$ | 0.1711 | 0.001 | - | - |
| AU* $Asset_k$ | 0.0409 | 0.521 | - | - |
| BE* $Asset_k$ | -0.0367 | 0.499 | - | - |
| CA* $Asset_k$ | 0.0250 | 0.601 | - | - |
| CH* $Asset_k$ | 0.0808 | 0.157 | - | - |
| DE* $Asset_k$ | 0.1030 | 0.037 | - | - |
| DK* $Asset_k$ | -0.1309 | 0.003 | - | - |
| ES* $Asset_k$ | 0.1503 | 0.000 | - | - |
| FI* $Asset_k$ | -0.1651 | 0.001 | - | - |
| FR* $Asset_k$ | 0.0587 | 0.069 | - | - |
| UK* $Asset_k$ | -0.0125 | 0.650 | - | - |
| IE* $Asset_k$ | 0.0358 | 0.547 | - | - |
| IT* $Asset_k$ | 0.1760 | 0.000 | - | - |
| JP* $Asset_k$ | 0.2013 | 0.001 | - | - |
| LU* $Asset_k$ | 0.2995 | 0.000 | - | - |
| NL* $Asset_k$ | 0.0875 | 0.013 | - | - |
| NO* $Asset_k$ | -0.1162 | 0.013 | - | - |
| NZ* $Asset_k$ | 0.0922 | 0.533 | - | - |
| SE* $Asset_k$ | -0.0574 | 0.091 | - | - |
| AT* $Prof_k$ | 0.1800 | 0.521 | - | - |
| AU* $Prof_k$ | 0.2384 | 0.003 | - | - |
| BE* $Prof_k$ | 0.1109 | 0.501 | - | - |
| CA* $Prof_k$ | 0.0368 | 0.642 | - | - |
| CH* $Prof_k$ | 0.1944 | 0.381 | - | - |
| DE* $Prof_k$ | 0.2349 | 0.004 | - | - |
| DK* $Prof_k$ | 0.1378 | 0.293 | - | - |
| ES* $Prof_k$ | 0.0377 | 0.732 | - | - |
| FI* $Prof_k$ | 0.2374 | 0.003 | - | - |
| FR* $Prof_k$ | 0.1298 | 0.252 | - | - |
| UK* $Prof_k$ | 0.2402 | 0.002 | - | - |
| IE* $Prof_k$ | 0.2363 | 0.009 | - | - |
| IT* $Prof_k$ | -0.0641 | 0.165 | - | - |
| JP* $Prof_k$ | 0.0080 | 0.947 | - | - |
| LU* $Prof_k$ | 0.0946 | 0.749 | - | - |
| NL* $Prof_k$ | 0.1548 | 0.238 | - | - |
| NO* $Prof_k$ | 0.0894 | 0.454 | - | - |
| NZ* $Prof_k$ | 0.2383 | 0.008 | - | - |
| SE* $Prof_k$ | -0.0338 | 0.357 | - | - |

to be continued on next page

Table 9: Regression results for candidate-country fixed effects and target-specific variables $Asset_k$ and $Prof_k$, column (4) of Table 4, continued

| Variable name | Mean | P-value | Standard deviation | P-value | Standard deviation |
|---------------|---------|---------|--------------------|---------|--------------------|
| AT | -5.1742 | 0.000 | 1.2050 | 0.029 | |
| AU | -2.4318 | 0.001 | 0.0211 | 0.978 | |
| BE | -4.2108 | 0.000 | -1.8320 | 0.000 | |
| CA | -3.1148 | 0.000 | 1.3847 | 0.000 | |
| CH | -6.2171 | 0.000 | 2.6419 | 0.000 | |
| DE | -5.2168 | 0.000 | 2.8341 | 0.000 | |
| DK | -0.9842 | 0.088 | -0.1596 | 0.800 | |
| ES | -3.5507 | 0.000 | -0.3294 | 0.358 | |
| FI | -1.6835 | 0.011 | 1.4481 | 0.000 | |
| FR | -2.2515 | 0.000 | -0.2669 | 0.595 | |
| UK | -1.0358 | 0.032 | -0.1062 | 0.679 | |
| IE | -3.5946 | 0.000 | 0.2005 | 0.752 | |
| IT | -4.0416 | 0.000 | -0.4134 | 0.559 | |
| JP | -4.3595 | 0.006 | 1.4957 | 0.002 | |
| LU | -8.8030 | 0.000 | -1.1255 | 0.129 | |
| NL | -3.2028 | 0.000 | 1.1377 | 0.005 | |
| NO | -1.4745 | 0.006 | 0.2611 | 0.492 | |
| NZ | -4.4730 | 0.015 | 0.7336 | 0.487 | |
| SE | -1.1132 | 0.033 | 0.3693 | 0.142 | |

This table reports supplemental results of regression (4) in Table 4. The first part of the table lists the coefficients (and corresponding p-values) of the target-specific variables $Asset_k$ and $Prof_k$ interacted with potential acquirer locations. The second part of the table reports the means and standard deviations of the random coefficients of the potential acquirer country dummy variables and their corresponding p-values. In all cases, the U.S. represents the base category.

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